In the early hours of last Monday morning, two Israeli hostages of Argentinian origin – Luis Har and Fernando Marman from Kibbutz Nir Yitzhak –were freed from their place of captivity aboveground in Rafah.
I happened to wake up last Monday at around 5 a.m., and since I had some problems with my TV the previous evening, switched it on to see whether it was working properly. At this early hour, channels 11, 12 and 13 (but for some reason, not channel 14) all had very preliminary reports, presented by bleary-eyed reporters, of the successful operation, which had ended without any casualties on our side, but of dozens of terrorists and civilians killed on the Palestinian side.
The fact that the complicated, impressively executed operation, in which the Counterterrorism Unit, Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), 7th Armored Brigade, Shayetet 13, and the air force had participated in perfect synchronization, ended in success certainly constituted a public uplift in these extremely complicated and emotional days. However, it was in no way a game changer.
This operation raised the number of hostages freed by Israel through the use of force since October 7 to three, while around 120 (Israelis and non-Israelis) were freed by means of agreements with Hamas, leaving another 134 in captivity – of whom at least 85 (though hopefully more) are believed to be alive. Three managed to free themselves, but were subsequently killed accidentally by our forces.
The advantage of freeing hostages by force is that Israel is thus absolved from having to release large numbers of terrorists imprisoned in Israel, and from committing itself to ceasefires, or the complete ending of hostilities, which it is currently opposed to.
The disadvantages of using force are that the chances of failure are usually substantial, and the hostages and/or Israeli forces involved are liable to be killed – as has apparently occurred in the past on several occasions, though we are not informed of the number of casualties involved.
If anyone is personally aware of the danger of loss of life on our side in such operations, it is undoubtedly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Netanyahu’s older brother, Lt.-Col. Yoni Netanyahu, was killed in Entebbe on July 4, 1976, during an Israeli operation to release Israeli and Jewish hostages on board an Air France flight, which had been hijacked to Uganda by terrorists – an operation that Yoni had commanded. Three Israeli hostages were also killed during the operation.
The Gaza hostage situation is unique from previous ones and Israel needs to act accordingly
Of course, the Entebbe operation in no way resembles any potential current operation to free hostages, simply because the hostages are scattered in numerous locations throughout the Gaza Strip, and these locations are only rarely known to us.
Furthermore, in the current case, the circumstances in which the hostages were kidnapped were particularly complicated, since the opportunity for Hamas and others to kidnap the hostages was created by a total failure of the state to prevent an invasion into the Gaza border area from the Strip, and its total failure, for many hours, to introduce forces in order to save its citizens from torture, death, and/or being kidnapped.
Israel was in no way responsible for the Air France flight being hijacked to Entebbe, but nevertheless considered it its duty to release its hapless kinsmen and citizens. In the case of October 7, it was guilty of breaking its duty toward its citizens in the Gaza border area, and now has a moral duty to do everything in its power to save those of them who are still in captivity.
TODAY, THE circumstances behind the attempts to arrange the release of the hostages also appear to include cross-purposes and growing animosity between Netanyahu and many of the families of the hostages, and political considerations by the prime minister, whose primary goal appears to be ensuring the survival of his all-right government and his own political career.
The impression one gets is that though Netanyahu is not oblivious to the fate of the hostages and their families, and is not opposed on principle to negotiating with Hamas an agreement that would bring about the release of part or all of the hostages, the immediate release of the hostages is less urgent, in his opinion, than destroying Hamas militarily and politically, while the price he is willing to pay for a deal is not limitless.
On the other hand, the hostages’ families, and their numerous supporters believe that everything should be done, as fast as possible, to release all the hostages who are still alive, because the longer they stay in captivity the greater the chances that they will not survive because of insufficient nutrition, the absence of the medication that many of them require, the poor physical conditions of their incarceration, and the danger of their being shot dead by their keepers under certain unexpected circumstances.
Netanyahu does not hide his impatience with the aggressive campaign carried out by most of the hostages’ families for the hostages’ immediate release, at almost any cost, which he believes encourages Hamas to raise the price it is demanding for their release. However, there is little doubt that Hamas was well aware of Israeli sensitivities on the issue of hostages when it originally planned its attack, and that the current activities of the families are not really having an effect on its negotiation tactics.
That Netanyahu recently opposed Israeli participation in the current negotiations initiated by the mediators in Cairo to work out an outline for an agreement between Israel and Hamas, and then, after allowing an Israeli team to go to Cairo just to listen but not to present any Israeli proposals, decided to prevent the team from returning to Cairo for a second round, is viewed by those calling for the immediate return of the hostages as proof that Netanyahu does not really want an agreement.
The reality is probably not that black-and-white. Netanyahu argues that as long as Hamas demands a complete cessation of the fighting and an Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, as well as an outrageous “exchange rate” between Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners in Israel (many with blood on their hands), Israel should not participate in any talks or make any proposals.
Nevertheless, one is still left with the impression that Netanyahu could be more highly motivated in dealing with the hostage issue, and one cannot help wondering whether his motivation would not be greater if there were settlers from Judea and Samaria among the hostages, or if more of them were from among his supporters.
That also Hamas in general and Yahya Sinwar in particular do not seem particularly eager to reach an agreement regarding the hostages, and are more concerned with ending Israel’s presence in the Strip, does not bode well for the rapid release of the hostages.
One thing that is certain is that the tension between the prime minister and the majority of the hostages’ families is not contributing anything to the need for unity in Israel, which Netanyahu spoke about so emphatically in his TV statement last Saturday evening.
The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher and has published extensively both journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book, Israel’s Knesset Members – A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job, was published by Routledge last year.