Israelis can take pride. Our prime minister has gone up in the estimation of our American allies.
Whereas unnamed officials in the Obama administration famously deemed the prime minister a “chicken sh**,” President Biden has privately called him merely an “a**hole.” This is hardly a term of endearment, but it’s a small improvement, and American English has room for far worse. Whether or not these terms truly reflect the prime minister’s character, the strategic document he issued almost in secret a few days ago, titled “Day After Hamas,” is really little more than horse excrement.
Nearly five months after the war broke out, under the prime minister’s (malfeasant) tutelage, Israelis are entitled to finally hear from him about his strategy for the post-war period. They have endured and sacrificed enough for this to be a reasonable expectation, and sufficient time has passed. Now, apparently bowing to both domestic pressure and especially demands from Washington rather than to any sense of duty, the prime minister has finally presented a “plan.” It is, however, a totally one-sided military document that presents all of Israel’s maximalist positions. In and of themselves, most, albeit not all, of the positions are justified. In their entirety, they are not only unacceptable to the Palestinians but to the US as well, and the absence of any diplomatic vision for the future is especially glaring.
According to the prime minister, the IDF will continue fighting until the hostages have been returned, Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities have been destroyed, and the long-term threat it poses to Israel has come to an end. To this end, Gaza is to be completely demilitarized, and Israel will retain indefinite freedom of military action in Gaza, exercise control over the Rafah corridor, and establish a buffer zone along the border. Civil administration is to be based on Gazans with administrative experience but with no ties to states or organizations that support terrorism.
As for the prime minister’s vision for the future, reconstruction of Gaza is to begin only after it has been demilitarized and a comprehensive de-radicalization program of all religious, educational, and welfare institutions has begun. In other words, shortly before the Messiah arrives. Moreover, Israel is to maintain security control over the entire area west of the Jordan River (the West Bank and Gaza), rejects international attempts to dictate the outcome of negotiations, and opposes unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state.
What this means in plain English is open-ended military control of Gaza and de facto annexation of the West Bank. It reflects a refusal to face a harsh but simple reality: There are only two realistic sources of governance in Gaza after the war: Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). A resumption of Israeli control over 2.3 million hostile Gazans is exactly what Hamas wants and would hand it its greatest military victory. It would ensure that Israel becomes mired in a never-ending quagmire, one that saps its national vitality and military strength, undermines what’s left of its international standing, and, most importantly, dooms it a one-state reality. National security decisions are often simply a choice between bad options. Resumption of control by a “revitalized” PA would be the best of them.
Attempts to find “technocratic” leaders in Gaza, unaffiliated with Hamas or other terrorist entities, are doomed to fail. Even technocratic leaders require overall political direction, which can come either from the PA or Hamas, and there are not many technocrats in Gaza who fit the bill to begin with. In the absence of the PA, these technocratic leaders would become, at best, a front for Hamas. For those with long memories, the attempt to find such untainted officials is reminiscent of Israel’s vacuous attempts to avoid dealing with the PLO in the 1970s by trying to establish “village associations” in the West Bank.
SO MUCH for Lala Land.
What we need now is serious policy and a true vision for the “day after.” After months of brutal fighting and at a heavy cost, the IDF has handed the government a significant military victory in Gaza. As it stands at present, this success constitutes a fundamental change in the situation that can pave the way for new opportunities. The achievement will be even greater if and when we complete the job in Rafah, an extremely difficult, painful, and essential move. Either way, Hamas will continue to exist as a military and political organization, but it will cease to be the governing body in Gaza, and its ability to cause Israel significant harm will be greatly diminished, at least for the foreseeable future.
Military success, critical though it is, is not sufficient. All major military operations must be founded on a political strategy, in the absence of which the IDF’s hard-won military achievements will be squandered and the lives of our soldiers sacrificed in vain.
The prime minister fully understands this, but he has other strategic priorities, none more important than staying in power to avoid legal jeopardy and an end to his less-than-illustrious reign. His so-called vision for the day after is long on what Israel will not agree to but silent on what it seeks for the future. Rather than a forward-looking strategic vision, it is little more than a campaign platform. It may shore up his coalition and satisfy the right, at least for now, but it does little to advance Israel’s position.
Creating a new regional order
The American plan for creating a new regional order, based on the establishment of a Palestinian state, normalization with the Saudis, and an anti-Iran axis comprised of Israel and the Sunni states, is certainly ambitious and probably unrealistic. It does, however, provide a road map for going forward and hope for a better future. Instead of presenting at least some indication of Israeli flexibility, some willingness to join the bandwagon, and an attempt to achieve a transformation of Israel’s strategic circumstances and strengthen the already-fraught relations with our foremost ally, the prime minister has once again positioned Israel as the rejectionist side.
The Palestinians, in contrast, who famously never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity, appear to be taking advantage of this one. The PA prime minister, Mohammad Shtayyeh, has submitted his cabinet’s resignation to President Abbas, and the latter has already named the putative leader of the new “technocratic” government in both the West Bank and Gaza. The various Palestinian factions, including Hamas, are scheduled to meet in Moscow in this regard.
Of far greater strategic importance to the prime minister, however, the threats to the longevity of the worst coalition in Israel’s history have been deferred once again, and with them the risks to his well-being.
Nothing is more important. Never before has “l’etat, c’est moi” been so true, more reprehensible, and more tragic. We, the people, have had enough of this bull manure. We demand a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
The writer, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He is the author of Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy; Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change; and Israel and the Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Superpower. Follow him on X: @chuck_freilich.