Many were perplexed by the seemingly yo-yo-like geopolitical moves of the United States the other week regarding Israel’s war against Hamas-ISIS.
At the start of the week, loudly echoing the conduct of the Obama administration, the United States abstained instead of vetoing a Russian-Chinese backed anti-Israel UN Security Council resolution. The abstention coming on the back of continuous and persistent US criticisms of how Israel is conducting the war.
The UN resolution called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza without any prerequisite for the release of Israeli hostages still held by the genocidal jihadist group. Hostages - men, women, and children - who have been abused, tortured, and raped for months now. Others have already been executed.
Then, at the end of the same week, The Washington Post reported that unnamed US officials had informed them of newly approved US arms transfers to Israel. These include heavy ordnance and the latest tranche of F-35 fighter jets. All items were approved for sale to Israel years ago, according to the report, and now given final procedural authorization for transfer. It was a move that came across as detached from the earlier UN vote and the US discontent with Israeli actions that the vote was meant to convey.
Which begs the question, why even leak such mundane procedural steps in the first place. Especially when almost simultaneously the US military’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put out a statement that could be interpreted as another attempt at publicizing the US’s discontent with Israel. It indicated that the US has not been able to provide Israel with all the weapons types that it has requested.
Geopolitical dynamics
Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. was quoted as saying, “Because they’ve asked for stuff that [we]... either don’t have the capacity [for] or not willing to provide, not right now, in particular.”
The “not right now” and “capacity” could be understood as a reference to acute shortages in the United States’ own weapons stocks. Stocks drained by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, as well as slowdowns in procurement and atrophied production with the winding down of those conflicts. More recently, the arming of Ukraine in its war with Russia has made the issue more acute.
The “not willing to provide” portion of the statement, most likely refers to certain weapons Israel adds to its requests, with the knowledge that the US is not willing to export/share those items. The purpose being that those items serve as a “high bar” to be negotiated down, which eases the approval of sale of other weapons.
So again, why the conflicting moves and statements by the US? Moves that do not fit the popular narrative - and one that history does not bear out - that Israel is contained in some way by the US’s ability unilaterally, and on a whim, to halt the sale and supply of certain armaments.
The reason for the confusing actions and statements is geopolitical theater in the service of dueling interests. This is a central element in the management of the symbiotic yet not fully in-sync relationship between Israel and the United States. That very symbiosis serves to limit the US’s levers of pressure on Israel and vice versa.
The difference being with Israel’s leverage on the United States, or in many instances lack thereof, is that it is superseded by Israel’s own fundamental national security and existential needs. One of the innumerable examples of this being Israel’s decision to destroy Syria’s nuclear program after informing the US of its existence, and the US refusing to attack it.
The United States’ UN Security Council abstentionis one of those many instances when the two countries’ interests clash head on. For the Biden administration, numerous factors led to the decision, among them the administration’s liberal-progressive worldview, domestic politics in an election year, and the desire to placate other US allies such as Qatar.
So, in this case, as in many others, diplomatic posturing, occasional media manipulation, clashing official and unofficial statements, and “back of the house” horse trading, are the norm in the geopolitical theater that is part and parcel of US-Israel relations.
A symbiotic arms dynamic relationship
Part of the flip side of the relations equation is US arms sales and transfers to Israel. These are of mutual interest to both countries, sharply reflecting the symbiotic elements of the bilateral relationship.
For one thing, the deployment and use of US-manufactured weapons by Israel is a major sales and marketing tool for US defense companies. Israel’s effective and varied use of the weapons provides them a world-renowned stamp of approval as well as highly efficient battlefield testing. That is worth billions of dollars to the US defense industry and Washington. The recent arms transfers also serve to create even more urgency in Washington for the ramping up of US weapons manufacturing and procurement to replenish the United States’ own continually drained stocks.
Another factor for the United States is reduced competition on global markets from Israeli-manufactured weapons systems. Those systems and platforms would be produced more widely and for new purposes, creating a more challenging marketplace for US manufacturers, if Israel were not to buy the US-produced armaments. The Lavi fighter jet program being a well-known case in point back in the 1980s.
The $3 billion that the US allocates annually to Israel for arms purchases that must be made from US companies is also an indirect subsidy to the US weapons industry. As for Israel, being able to remove $3b. worth of expenses from its annual defense budget is very convenient. Even though that is no longer a very large amount given Israel’s economic prowess in recent decades and its ranking among the most prosperous countries on earth.
Under the current set of circumstances between the two countries, Israel also enjoys the benefit of being able to focus its industrial base and arms manufacturing on more tailor-made and high-technology platforms, while acquiring certain US equipment [which it upgrades and adapts with indigenous systems] that is mass produced for global markets.
In the last few years, a newer defense cooperation model of Israel-US joint ventures in weapons and defense systems further complicates the potential for any unilateral moves by the US that could damage the overall relationship.
In the case of the Iron Dome system, the US provided part of the funding for its development and for the production of parts of the system because it wanted access to its groundbreaking technology. It would also like to benefit from continuing to manufacture elements of the system in the US for third-party customers.
Israel is building its domestic defense capabilities
There are of course numerous other facets of the Israel-US relationship, from intelligence cooperation to business and trade and proverbial Judeo-Christian values. The events of the last few weeks though have underscored the more realpolitik elements of the relationship and the limits of leverage.
As the United States becomes more polarized sociopolitically, continues to rapidly change demographically, and, as with much of the Western world, is gripped by a more progressive post-modern outlook, relations with the State of Israel will become more strained.
Looking forward, the State of Israel will strengthen even further the freedom of action and unilateral approach and capabilities it has lived by since 1948. In the aftermath of October 7, the country has come to understand that it must fully prioritize the original Ben-Gurion model of maximum domestic capabilities and capacities.
That is why almost immediately with the outbreak of the war, the Israeli government ordered a massive ramp-up of domestic weapons production and the establishment of new production capabilities. This after years of adopting the more convenient trends of outsourcing, global markets, and commercial efficiency, which saw the reduction or closure of certain domestic Israeli production.
Today, more than at any time since its reestablishment in 1948, the State of Israel has the resources and capabilities to domestically produce most, if not all, of its essential defense needs. Heavier platforms such as aircraft and certain types of ships, that could potentially be produced in Israel, will most likely continue to be purchased from foreign manufacturers in the near term.
Increasingly, however, this will be done in the framework of joint partnerships with multiple countries and with reciprocal purchases being a central condition. This will strengthen and develop partnerships for the future, helping to offset any reduction in the relationship with the US or other allies whose interests grow further apart from Israel’s.
The writer is an Israeli hi-tech entrepreneur and a member of the Israel Leadership Forum. He is involved with various Israel advocacy causes including working with Christian Zionist and pro-Israel Noahide groups.