The other day, I reread an article I had written for the Labor Zionist Jewish Frontier monthly in July 1998. This was two years into Benjamin Netanyahu’s first premiership, against the background of talks with the Palestinians about a second redeployment of the IDF in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, following the Hebron Agreement of January 1997.
To my great surprise, what I described in that article roughly describes the current situation.
“In recent weeks, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has, time and again, informed the world that very soon an agreement will be signed regarding a second redeployment of Israeli forces on the basis of the Hebron Agreement, which he himself signed with the Palestinians.
“And yet the agreement, all the details of which appear... to have been worked out by Israel and the Americans, and accepted by the Palestinians (though nobody seems completely sure who agreed to what), has failed to materialize.
“At first, the excuse for the delay was that the Israeli cabinet had not agreed to the extent of the territory to be handed over to the Palestinians. Some ministers, including Defense Minister Yitzchak Mordechai (Likud), appear to have accepted the figure of 13% of the area of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
“Others, like infrastructure minister Ariel Sharon (Likud) argued that anything above 9% constituted a real security risk. Still others, like education minister Rabbi Yitzhak Levy (National Religious Party) continued to argue that any withdrawal was dangerous and threatened to leave the government if an agreement were reached on a second redeployment.
“But finally, Netanyahu appeared to succumb to American pressure and agreed to 13%. However, then everything got stuck again. The prime minister started arguing that before Israel would agree to a further withdrawal, the Palestinians had to start implementing previous agreements, like the cancellation of offensive articles in the Palestine National Covenant by the Palestine National Council, and the willingness of the Palestinian Authority to hand over to Israel persons accused by Israel of having been involved in acts of terror.
“Since there is nothing new in these demands, and even though Israel has the right – even an obligation – to insist that the Palestinians fulfill their part in previous agreements between the two sides, one gets the feeling that the insistence on their immediate fulfillment at this juncture is little more than just another delaying tactic on Netanyahu’s part...
“What exactly is going on? Nobody really knows. The opposition has been arguing that even if Netanyahu himself has understood that there is no way Israel can avoid the second redeployment, his real concern is to keep his very problematic coalition together, and he is clumsily maneuvering between those who are saying that unless the redeployment takes place very soon they are going to leave the government... and those who are threatening to leave the government if any sort of redeployment takes place...
“As long as Netanyahu stalls, he has got his government. The moment he makes a decision, his government (which currently commands the support of a mere 61 MKs) is liable to fall.”
History repeats itself
SOUND FAMILIAR? Stalling tactics, agreements allegedly reached thanks to American pressure but which Netanyahu is ambivalent about, total lack of clarity as to what is really going on, and last but not least: Netanyahu trying to avoid any sort of action that might endanger the continued existence of his coalition.
Of course, the background of the two situations is totally different. Though there was a sense of crisis back in 1998, and Netanyahu was concerned with trying to mitigate the damage he perceived in the 1993 Oslo Accords – a move viewed by the Right as the first step toward a two-state solution, which he had inherited from Yitzhak Rabin’s government – today the situation is very different.
Today, Israel is in a state of a multi-front military confrontation, imposed on it by Hamas’s surprise attack on the Gaza border communities on October 7, 2023. Netanyahu – now standing at the head of his sixth government – appears to be opposed to bringing about an end to this war before a total victory over Hamas, even if this means abandoning all or part of the 120 hostages, both alive and dead. Abducted by Hamas on that day and being held in the Gaza Strip, they are still languishing in captivity more than nine months later. But Netanyahu’s tactics remain the same.
In 1998, I pointed out that Netanyahu had three options to get out of the situation. The first was to form a national unity government with the Labor Party, which commanded 34 Knesset seats. The second was to call early elections. The third was not to take any action and to wait for a miracle to occur.
Strangely enough, once again these are the three options today. Now, as then, Netanyahu could form an authentic national unity government with the current Center/Right and Center/Left opposition parties, and replace his 64-member all-right coalition with a more stable formation. Alternatively, he could give in to the opposition’s demand for early elections, or he could continue to decide not to decide, and await the occurrence of a miracle.
In 1999, what finally took place was an early election. However, the background to the election was not the fact that the redeployment agreement came to naught. It resulted from the fact that the Likud-Gesher-Tsomet parliamentary group started to disintegrate, and that the government was unable to muster a majority to pass the 1999 budget.
In the 1999 elections, Labor’s Ehud Barak was elected prime minister in direct elections. In the Knesset elections, Likud came in second, after the Labor Party (which ran under the name One Israel), and Netanyahu remained out of the Prime Minister’s Residence on Balfour Street for the next 10 years.
Whether the current situation will lead to early elections is yet to be seen. At least in theory, Netanyahu could continue to rule with his current 64-member coalition if he manages to satisfy everyone’s demands regarding the continuation of the war, holding back on the full return of the hostages, and solving the IDF’s manpower shortages without a massive enlistment of haredi youths who are not full-time yeshiva students.
No matter how impressive the demonstrations calling for early elections are, unless at least five MKs from the coalition decide to vote with the opposition for early elections, this will not occur.
At the moment, it seems that the difficulties the Finance Ministry is having in putting together a budget for 2025 is what could bring about early elections. However, it cannot be ruled out that the issue of the enlistment (or non-enlistment) of haredi youths to military service could also result in early elections. All the polls predict that if elections are held soon, a change of government is imminent.
What could prevent a movement toward early elections is if Netanyahu decides to go ahead with his outline for the release of the hostages – all or in part – in return for a temporary but lengthy ceasefire and the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners, including hundreds with blood on their hands.
It is yet to be seen what effect the alleged elimination by Israeli forces of Mohammed Deif last Saturday, will have on the negotiations.
The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher, and has published extensively both journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book, "Israel’s Knesset Members – A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job," was published by Routledge.