Will Dahlan soon find himself paraphrasing Winston Churchill on the day he was chosen to lead Britain’s government in World War II: “I felt as if I were walking with destiny, and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial...”?
Whether or not this is on the horizon, for the present Dahlan is content to play the well-known political game – whatever high office you are aiming for, swear that nothing is further from your thoughts.
On July 24, Dahlan posted the following on his X account, referring to himself in the plural as the royal “we”: “Various scenarios have been repeatedly presented or leaked to the media regarding the arrangements for the “day after” Israel’s devastating war on Gaza. Sometimes our name is used to thrill audiences".
"Therefore and once again, we reiterate that... Our highest priority now is to end the war. We will not support any choice that has not been reached based on Palestinian national understandings [achieved] through a transparent democratic process... I have repeatedly refused to accept any security, governmental, or executive role," he continued.
Rumors were obviously already rife. Two days after his post, these were given substance in a long article in The Wall Street Journal.
“The question of who will govern Gaza,” it began, “has plagued efforts to end Israel’s nine-month war to destroy Hamas... Some negotiators are increasingly drawn to Mohammed Dahlan as a temporary solution to a dilemma facing postwar Gaza.”
The Wall Street Journal goes on to quote Israeli political analysts who have described Dahlan as a rare Palestinian leader who is independent of both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA), making him someone with whom the Israeli government could potentially work.
Dahlan was born in 1961 in Khan Yunis in Gaza and, as a teenager, helped set up the Fatah Youth Movement. In his 20s he was arrested by the Israeli authorities more than once for political activism, but never for terrorist activities. He put his time in Israeli prisons to good use by learning Hebrew, which he speaks fluently.
After the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, Dahlan was chosen to head the Preventive Security Force in Gaza. Building up a force of 20,000 men, he became one of the most powerful of Palestinian leaders.
It was during this period that he was formally tarred with the terrorist brush. In November 2000, on the basis of convincing evidence, Dahlan and his deputy, Rashid Abu Shadak – who has a less savory background – were accused of being behind the bombing of an Israeli school bus that killed two adults and wounded several children. Israel’s then-prime minister, Ehud Olmert, ordered the bombing of Dahlan’s Gaza headquarters in reprisal.
GAZA HAD been nicknamed “Dahlanistan,” reflecting the extent of his authority, but in 1997 it emerged that he had been diverting taxes to his personal bank account. That incident and its consequences seem to have affected him profoundly.
Dahlan openly denounced the PA and Hamas for corruption and crime.
In 2001, he began denouncing corruption in the PA and calling for reform. A year later he resigned and, portraying himself as an outspoken critic of PA president Yasser Arafat, repeatedly tried to campaign on an anti-corruption and reform ticket. As a result, Dahlan and his followers won over most of the Fatah sections in Gaza.
The 2006 Palestinian elections saw Hamas gain a majority in Gaza. Dahlan called their election victory a “disaster,” and in January 2007 held the biggest-ever rally of Fatah supporters in Gaza, where he denounced Hamas as “a bunch of murderers and thieves.”
His instinct was vindicated six months later when Hamas staged a bloody coup in Gaza, seized power, and expelled those Fatah officials it had not murdered. Years later, it was revealed that Dahlan played a key role in an abortive US plot to remove Hamas from power.
In October 2007, the Bush administration reportedly pressured PA President Mahmoud Abbas to appoint Dahlan as his deputy. Instead, perceiving Dahlan as his rival for office, Abbas publicly charged him, in June 2011, with financial corruption and murder and expelled him from Fatah’s ruling body. Abbas went further and accused him of murdering Arafat – though he never charged him formally.
Today, Dahlan’s international influence extends far and wide. He has lived in the UAE for many years and is an adviser to the crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan. He has ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Syrian opposition, and is closely connected with Serbia and Montenegro.
The WSJ claims that Hamas has softened its opposition to Dahlan, indicating to mediators in recent weeks that it could accept him as part of an interim solution to help end the war. Dahlan has said he now speaks to Hamas regularly.
QUOTING ARAB officials, the WSJ has its own vision of the “day after.” An option currently under consideration sees Dahlan overseeing a Palestinian security body comprising 2,500 personnel working in coordination with an international force, once Israeli troops eventually pull out of Gaza.
The Palestinian body would be vetted by the US, Israel, and Egypt, and wouldn’t have clear loyalties to the PA, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu doesn’t want controlling Gaza. If successful, the force could expand to help with the reconstruction of Gaza.
Polls of Palestinian public opinion show little enthusiasm for Dahlan as a potential leader. The latest, taken in June, reveals the favorite by far is Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five life sentences in an Israeli jail on charges of murder. He received 39% of the popular vote. Some way behind him was Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas political leader who was assassinated on July 31.
Dahlan’s popularity at 8% was found to be about equal to that of Yahya Sinwar, now both military and political leader of Hamas, and currently hiding in the tunnel system that crisscrosses Gaza.
If Dahlan, as he claims in his July 24 social media posting, is depending on a “transparent democratic process” to project him to power, he would seem to have a long time to wait. He is far more likely to find himself in a leadership position by way of an appointment agreed between the nations engaged in negotiating a ceasefire and the release of the hostages.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.