Many international actors and figures in the domestic Israeli arena have emphasized time and again the need to sign a “hostage deal” quickly to save some of the hostages and achieve a ceasefire. This, they believe, would encourage Hezbollah to end its war of attrition against Israel.
The Americans hope the deal will also prevent Iran and Hezbollah’s promised military retaliations against the Jewish state. The Americans want to achieve regional calm and hope that a deal will prevent escalation and spare them the need to intervene militarily. The rest of the world also desires an end to the war in Gaza.
Some argue that the ceasefire would give the IDF time to recover from the prolonged fighting and to prepare properly for an anticipated, perhaps inevitable war against Hezbollah – and possibly to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat as well.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that if the ceasefire brings an end of the war, as many expect, Saudi Arabia will return to the negotiating table on normalization with Israel, and the anti-Iranian axis that the US is working to build will emerge. The last sweetener in Washington’s hands is that the end of the war will pave the way for the reconstruction of Gaza and the establishment of an American-backed, Palestinian Authority-controlled reformed Palestinian state.
However, this perspective is no more than wishful thinking: Perhaps Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar intends to continue fighting to bring about the “unification of fronts” against Israel? Even if we assume that the terrorist leader’s difficult military situation pushes him toward a deal, his goal is the end of the war and the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza.
The first phase of the discussed deal with Hamas will likely end the war, and the chances of its renewal to complete the task of dismantling Hamas are slim. Sinwar will remain in Gaza with a significant number of fighters, with no opposition to hinder him from restoring Hamas’s rule over the Strip, and with the remaining hostages under his captivity, who will serve as a security buffer and a means of blackmail against Israel.
AN IMAGE of Sinwar emerging from hiding, amid the victory cheers of Palestinian terrorists released from Israeli prisons, would represent a defeat for Israel. Moreover, when the top brass of the IDF signals fatigue and a reluctance to confront Hamas, Israel conveys weakness: a recipe for continued and even increased aggression against it.
It is also uncertain whether Hezbollah will call an end to its war of attrition in the North, as the war aligns with the strategy dictated by Tehran: to harm Israel’s civilian population. Why would Hezbollah relinquish a significant achievement like emptying northern Israel in the area near the Lebanese border of its inhabitants? The terrorist group also sees how Jerusalem is hesitant to launch a war against it. And who can guarantee that the Houthis will stop launching rockets and drones from Yemen into Israel? American retaliation against the Houthis have not deterred them from blocking the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Contrary to Washington’s assessments, there will be no regional calm, because ending the war at this time, in this manner, is a victory for the Iranian-led radical Islamic “Axis of Resistance.” Even if we assume that Iran does not want to retaliate against Israel for the assassination of Hamas’s “political” leader Ismail Haniyeh (a problematic assumption), there is no reason to believe it will stop encouraging its proxies in the region to spill Jewish blood.
Besides all this, there are additional conflicts in the Middle East where violence is part and parcel of the rules of the regional game – for example, the conflicts in Sudan and Libya. Turkey, whose soldiers are present in several countries in the region, is not lacking bloodlust either.
Furthermore, if Israel is perceived as losing the war, while the Saudis and other “moderate” Arab states yearn for an Israeli victory over the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, no anti-Iranian axis that Israel is a part of will emerge. An Israeli military failure in Gaza will lead Arab states to distance themselves from Jerusalem, as it will be seen as ineffective against Iran. Even the Abraham Accords, a major American achievement, will be at risk. Israel is a desired partner only if it is strong.
OF COURSE, the American hope for a “reformed” Palestinian state is naive or foolish. Unfortunately, the best future scenario for the Palestinians is a corrupt and faltering Palestinian Authority. It could spiral into a civil war because of the succession struggle developing in the authority due to Mahmoud Abbas’s advanced age (88).
Hamas will also participate in this – and if the Americans push for elections (their preferred means for democratization), it should be remembered that even before October 7, Hamas won democratic elections in 2005 and then forcibly took over Gaza. Additionally, support for the terrorist group has only grown following the barbaric attack on Israel, as all polls have shown.
A moral obligation to return the hostages, but cautions ahead
There is, of course, a moral obligation to return hostages. The IDF has acted to free hostages and even risks soldiers for bodies – six were just recovered, it was announced earlier this week.
Ransom for hostages is a “great commandment,” meaning it is significant and important. However, it is not an absolute command. The Mishnah teaches that “we do not redeem captives for more than their worth due to the repair of the world: so that [their captors] do not strive to increase the number of captives” (Tractate Gittin, Mishnah 4:6). The ransom for the hostages should not be excessive: this was also determined by a committee headed by Supreme Court Justice Meir Shamgar. While setting a reasonable price is subject to debate, the principle is correct.
The moral calculation must include the fact that releasing an unknown number of terrorists in exchange for some of the hostages poses a tangible danger to Israeli citizens. The more than a thousand released in the Schalit deal are responsible for the deaths of many Israelis. Israel has already had to deal with several terrorists among those released in November 2023 – including Sinwar himself. Is the blood of Israeli citizens who have been or will be killed due to released terrorists’ return to hostile terrorist activities considered any less red?
History proves that more victims of release agreements with terrorist organizations are a certainty. Therefore, the emerging deal is problematic from a moral standpoint.
It also has strategic flaws because it will likely lead to the cessation of the war – and because the withdrawal from Gaza in the first phase of the deal does not leave Israel with leverage to secure the release of the remaining hostages held by the murderous organization.
Moreover, the proposed technological alternatives to the presence of IDF soldiers are not credible, and Gaza will return to Hamas’s control. Israel must not allow such a scenario – and must stand firm on the battlefield as well as at the negotiating table.
The writer is the president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and head of the Department of Strategy, Diplomacy, and National Security at the Shalem Academic Center.