Immediately after the October 7 onslaught, I was asked by the headquarters of the hostages’ families to lead a team tasked with generating ideas to assist in the return of the hostages. The volunteer team was composed of former Foreign Ministry officials and other relevant experts. I was not alone in my feeling that the effort to obliterate Hamas might come at the cost of hostages’ lives, contrary to what the prime minister and the IDF chief of staff argued – that it would lead to their release.
The internal contradiction in the government’s war objectives was evident, but the shock of the terrible disaster made it difficult for many to fully recognize and openly express the conflict between the government’s stated policy and the goals of the bereaved families.
I summarized the ideas from the team’s discussions in a document that was submitted to those in charge of the hostage issue about a week before the start of the ground operation in Gaza. The paper was not intended to recommend a single course of action, but rather to offer a series of insights meant to serve as a basis for further elaboration by the authorized government officials. Among other things, it stated:
“Israel needs an ‘address,’ a counterpart with whom a hostage release deal could be struck, and therefore that ‘address’ must be kept alive.
“[There should be] a directive from the Government of Israel: The release of the hostages is the highest, most important, and immediate priority. Therefore, this is the operational objective of the IDF and security services. Military plans should be updated according to this goal, and intelligence resources, among others, should be directed toward achieving it.”
The team members hoped that these insights, and the additional practical ideas included in the paper, would be considered by the decision-makers who certainly see the bigger picture that is not necessarily clear to us. I did not question the right of a duly elected government to prefer one war goal over another, as long as it deliberated on the matter seriously and told the truth to the Israeli public – those who were required to bear the costs of the decision.
Now
Today – 11 months after the terrible massacre and the bitter news of hostages who were murdered during their captivity – it is clear that the political and security leaders misled the public by repeating the unfounded mantra that military pressure would lead to the hostages’ release and that the various war’s objectives were complementary.
(It should be noted that after months of difficult fighting, the leaders of the security establishment have apparently recognized their mistake and no longer echo Netanyahu’s sloganeering on the subject.)
The inherent contradiction in the government’s war goals misled the public – intentionally or unintentionally. Intentionally, if officials were aware that the effort to destroy Hamas might come at the cost of hostages’ lives; unintentionally, if officials were blind to the glaring contradiction in war objectives and perhaps, in their ineptitude, believed the propaganda they themselves espoused.
The inevitable state commission of inquiry will need to discuss the steps that led to the October 7 butchery as well as the war conducted in its wake. The commission will need to clarify how the argument that the eradication of Hamas would lead to the release of the hostages was born.
Was careful and orderly consideration given to defining the war goals and how they should be prioritized? Did the cabinet ministers identify and examine fundamental contradictions in the war’s objectives? Did they discuss the possibility of postponing the elimination of Hamas and restoring deterrence until after the hostages were liberated?
Did the General Staff conduct a professional, deep analysis of the operational implications of executing the goals that the IDF was ordered to achieve? Did the chief of staff demand that the cabinet decide on the order of urgency between war goals that could not be achieved simultaneously?
State commissions of inquiry are supposed to deal with facts, not psychological speculations. But perhaps this one will also consider a possible failure inherent in the tormenting guilt of key decision-makers for their own responsibility for the October 7 disaster; guilt that may have clouded their judgment.
Did they rationalize that had they prioritized the release of the hostages, they would have gone down in history as those who surrendered to Hamas and laid the ground for Israel’s worst defeat since its establishment? Perhaps, even unconsciously, they were ensnared by an overwhelming urge to erase some of the stain sticking to them and therefore preferred war and revenge over saving the hostages.
Then
IMMEDIATELY AFTER the October 7 mayhem, the question arose as to whether those responsible for the terrible failure – in the government and security establishment – should immediately tender their resignations. The prevailing opinion was that “you don’t change horses in midstream.”
It turns out that this was a costly mistake. The decision-making process regarding the war’s objectives and how it was to be prosecuted shows that the senior officials responsible for the failures of October 7 continued to fail after the disaster.
Our soldiers, who heroically risk their lives, deserve different political and military leadership – one that is worthy of their sacrifice.
The writer, a former director-general of the Foreign Ministry, is a senior research fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute. His novel Where Is the Head was recently published (Steimatzky).