With the elimination of Yahya Sinwar, there may now be, for the first time, a slightly better chance for an agreement on the hostages and ending the fighting in Gaza, unlike the on-again, off-again situation up to now.
Though the recent Doha talks apparently achieved no progress, due to Hamas’s continued recalcitrance, efforts by Israel and the intermediaries will continue.
As the US has confirmed more than once, Hamas, till now, has rejected all compromise proposals presented to it by the mediators or by President Joe Biden and demanded, among other matters, guarantees to maintaining its rule over Gaza and a total and immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops.
In addition, there were conditions with regard to the number and description of the Palestinian terrorists to be released by Israel, while the release of the hostages was to be piecemeal.
Basically, Hamas’s intention was to create a situation where it could come back another day and pursue its aim to collapse the foundations of the State of Israel and to wreak havoc among its citizens.
But this wasn’t always the distorted picture that was presented to the Israeli public and the families of the hostages.
Concerned families and near ones indeed have every right to say what they want, even if it’s insulting or foolish, believing that this will advance the release of their loved ones – and so have the crowds that gather every evening at Hostages Square – but not the cynical politicians and their PR agents who have created a false narrative, along the lines of George Orwell’s 1984, perversely claiming that the fate of the hostages actually depended on the Israeli government and not on Sinwar, thus playing directly into the latter’s hands.
Every well-organized protest gathering in Kaplan, in front of the Knesset or in Caesarea, every blocking of the Ayalon Highway, every demanding “Now” poster, encouraged Sinwar in his refusal to compromise – and endangered, and continues to endanger, the lives of the hostages.
A look back at history
To look at history, while Winston Churchill, during World War II, on several occasions had to make difficult, even tragic decisions between endangering the war effort and putting the lives of people in jeopardy, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose to avoid a moral and political dilemma of this sort by achieving both ends, defeating Hamas, leading to the release of the hostages as a result of this.
After October 7, 2023 (and the emphasis on “after”), Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, as well as in the north, is being conducted according to a structured strategic plan.
Broadly speaking, its goal, subject to partial or temporary changes caused by developments and events, including diplomatic ones, is to significantly improve Israel’s long-term security, while, in the shortest possible time frame, safely returning the hostages as well as the residents both in the South and in the North to their homes.
A no less important goal is the restoration of Israeli deterrence against Iran and its proxies, as well as reinforcing its standing in the region.
In the pursuit of both those aims, there has already been progress.
Sinwar’s death and the manner in which he met his end – abandoned, humiliated, and forsaken – may have turned a page, perhaps more than one, in achieving an end to the fighting in Gaza and arrangements acceptable to Israel with regard to the postwar situation there. But if not, the war will continue.
Though the prime minister was right to postpone discussions on Gaza’s political status until the end of the war, Sinwar’s demise and the advanced dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities have created a situation where Israel may soon have to consider various ways and scenarios regarding Gaza’s political status – despite the unclear political situation in the US and perhaps because of it – to assure that instead of reacting to proposals raised by others, both friendly and less so, Israel will put forward its own ideas.
These would probably include, in addition to holding the strategically important Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors, creating a security zone on the eastern and northern sides of the Gaza Strip, and ensuring intelligence and, if necessary, military freedom of action in Gaza, similar to Judea and Samaria.
The compounded Israeli failures that created the conditions for October 7 allowed Hamas to carry out its murderous plan, but it failed in all its strategic goals.
Though Israel was severely damaged, it did not collapse as Hamas had expected, as indicated among other things by the documents published in The New York Times and Haaretz, proving that Hamas believed that this would happen as a result of the division and polarization in Israeli society.
A quick recovery
The opposite occurred; the IDF quickly recovered and launched a powerful ground, air, and naval offensive (that by the way also contradicted previous theories about the supposed futility of operations in densely populated areas). Even the refusal to serve has disappeared, at least for now.
Under President Biden, the US – which Hamas and its Iranian partners believed would be hampered by the approaching elections, and despite occasional disagreements with Israel – immediately and forcefully stepped into the breach.
One of Sinwar’s further objectives was to disrupt the steps toward establishing full diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, leading to a broad geopolitical integration of the Middle East under US leadership.
Though the negotiations on this matter were halted, there are signs that they will resume in the future.
Biden and Netanyahu have a long-standing relationship, not devoid of occasional ups and downs, but on important issues, such as the IDF’s entry into Gaza or taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah, solutions were found, though there were also opposite examples, such as the heavy pressure on Israel to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza without conditioning it on the release of the hostages.
ALL THINGS considered, including Sinwar’s departure from the scene, it is still difficult to determine with certainty what the full dimensions and implications of this will be.
Some experts believe that since Sinwar had shaped Hamas in his image, with his death the organization itself might disappear or at lease lose much of its influence.
Another view holds that there will be splits, not only between Gaza and the outside but also within Gaza itself, with some factions focusing on rebuilding Hamas’s organizational and functional capabilities, while others may want to continue, even more strenuously, with terrorism against Israel in order to preserve the “legacy” of a leader who saw himself as the new Saladin (who wasn’t Arab), opposing the very existence of Israel, not just practically but also ideologically, and based on faith.
It is from them that the danger to the hostages now looms.
The elimination of Sinwar should indeed be seen as an important victory, but not yet a full achievement of Israel’s security and peace strategy.
Possible developments in coming weeks may indicate whether it will also bring about greater geopolitical results.
The writer, a former MK, served as ambassador to the US from 1990 to 1993 and from 1998 to 2000.