"You can pay me now, or you can pay me later.”
When the Fram oil filter company used this line in a TV commercial that aired in the United States more than 50 years ago, they were referring to the wisdom of taking the time to invest a small amount of money in an oil filter for one’s car to prevent a much more expensive and time-consuming engine repair job sometime later.
In international relations, a political vocabulary exists that creates a faux reality where diplomatic “arrangements” are presumed to reflect what diplomats claim they represent. For example, in the words of American mediator Amos Hochstein, this arrangement means an “end to the conflict” in Lebanon.
But in the real world, and the neighborhood that Israel lives in, these arrangements may only be a modern version of the Fram oil filter commercial, with diplomats in effect ignoring the signs that the oil filter needs to be changed instead of hoping for the best while it still causes damage.
Without changing the filters of Hezbollah and Hamas in the engine of the Middle East, the rot and corrosion will continue and eventually create problems whose cost to fix will be exponentially higher than simply changing the filter today. If we don’t pay the price today, the price will be much, much higher tomorrow.
If reports out of Lebanon are to be believed, discussions are now focused on ways to keep the old Hezbollah filter in its place and trying to create a mechanism to watch it and make sure it doesn’t damage the engine.
But as any amateur mechanic knows, keeping a defective oil filter in place is always a losing battle, and we all need to recognize that if the corrosive influence of Hezbollah remains in Lebanon, it is only a matter of time before the “pay me later” phase of dealing with one’s problems materializes.
Looking toward Gaza
The same is true with Gaza, where Hamas still runs the show and waits for a ceasefire that will allow it to survive, rebuild, and go back to work planning another October 7 replete with more murder, more destruction, and more hostages.
Psychology has taught us that immediate reinforcement is preferred to delayed punishment.
That explains why people prefer the instant pleasure of smoking or fast food to the delayed price that will have to be paid to one’s health. It explains why people gamble, where the hope of success wins over the probable financial losses the habit causes. It explains why the wish to end suffering now is often stronger than the knowledge that leaving pain untreated will only create greater pain in the future.
And it also explains why diplomats are tempted to arrange what will ultimately be only temporary quiet until the delayed damage inevitably shows its face.
Diplomatic “arrangements” are but another example of how short-term gain is psychologically stronger than long-term loss. The seductive lure of ending the war, releasing the hostages, and returning residents to their communities is understandable for Israelis who continue to worry about their relatives in captivity and their sons, husbands, and fathers in combat. It is a legitimate concern, and that explains why it is hard to argue against.
It is also a challenging concern, as we know that we need to eliminate the threat of terror from both Lebanon and the Palestinian-administered territories, but attaining it requires continuing a war that has a price.
That price is not insignificant. It involves delay in freeing the hostages, continued stress for soldiers’ families, and continued risks of military operations. That is the “pay me now” scenario. But the “pay me later” price of a reconstituted Hezbollah and Hamas with Iranian backing may be even more expensive.
The writer, a PhD, is a senior fellow and analyst in political psychology at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and a member of the emergency division of the IDF Home Front Command.