There are a few assumptions that can already be made. Biden will roll out the red carpet for Bennett, who in their meeting will have one chance to influence the trajectory of the top foreign policy issues that are going to accompany his two years in office and beyond.
The reason the administration will roll out the red carpet – it will be interesting to see if Biden takes Bennett on a walk in the Rose Garden or up to the residence to drink coffee – stems from the confluence of three events.
The first is that Biden and his team are happy to see Benjamin Netanyahu out of office. While Netanyahu claims that Biden is his old friend of 40 years, the Americans paint a different picture. Yes, Biden has always gotten along with Netanyahu despite fierce disagreements, but the Democratic Party and the White House have not forgotten the alleged insult Netanyahu showed them when he appeared before Congress and spoke against their president at the time, Barack Obama. Biden, let’s not forget, was the vice president.
The second reason for the red carpet roll-out is because the Americans want to see Netanyahu stay out of office, and they understand that they could play a key role in making that happen. As one former top Israeli diplomat explained to me this week, it will be easier for the Americans to topple the government than it will be for Netanyahu.
That is because under updated legislation passed in 2014, a no-confidence vote can only bring down a coalition if another alternative government is presented at the same time. This is called a “constructive no-confidence motion.” Without an alternative coalition, no-confidence votes mean nothing – and for now an alternative government is not possible. What is more likely to happen is that the government will implode from within over ideological differences or controversial legislation.
The Americans understand this and will – at least from Bennett’s perspective – hopefully take this into consideration when crafting ways to advance the hot issues that are currently on their Middle East agenda.
The third reason Biden will embrace Bennett is to try to bring him over to the American way of seeing things. While Bennett is an ideologue and genuinely opposed, for example, to a Palestinian state, the Americans understand that he has lost his voter base and will need to reinvent himself if he wants to stay in politics. The best way to do that will be by moving to the center. No one expects an Ariel Sharon disengagement-from-Gaza style transformation, but the Americans are hoping at least for something in that direction.
Ironically, Bennett’s coalition partners know this as well. Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz sit on a similar slot in the center, and by crowning Bennett as prime minister, they have knowingly and potentially created for themselves a new centrist rival. Nevertheless, the benefit of removing Netanyahu was greater for them than the risk of having Bennett one day compete with them for votes.
ON THE table right now are four issues that need to be resolved between the Bennett-Lapid government and the US.
The first two are the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and settlement construction in the West Bank. Both should be workable. Even with his right-wing positions, Bennett has previously expressed a readiness to invest money in Gaza as part of an effort to improve the quality of life there and stave off a future conflict.
This would include money – almost exclusively from the US and Europe – that goes toward rebuilding what was destroyed in the latest round of fighting, but also in creating joint industrial zones, an off-shore monitored port, and more. Back when Bennett was defense minister at the end of 2019, he ordered the IDF to conduct feasibility studies on a number of these initiatives. They could easily be dusted off and brought back to life.
On settlement construction, what happens next will mostly depend on the Americans. Bennett and New Hope leader Gideon Sa’ar will need to approve construction to stave off pressure from the Right and particularly Netanyahu, who is always going to be waiting to pounce on any sign of weakness or concession.
What this means is that a settlement freeze will not be possible, but quiet understandings that some construction will continue without drawing harsh condemnations could work in DC. Netanyahu also won’t be able to say much if that happens. Under his last few years in office, settler leaders were anyhow complaining that he had conceded to a silent settlement freeze. Bennett would need to build at least as much as Netanyahu to quell their criticism.
The two thornier issues are, first, the opening of a US consulate for Palestinians, possibly in east Jerusalem. The administration has expressed a desire to do so, but will need to ask the Israeli government for permission. This could rattle the Bennett-Lapid coalition.
But even if there is no way to easily figure out the consulate issue, it will dwarf in comparison with Iran, and the challenge Israel faces in how to confront the administration as it returns to the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal.
It would behoove the Biden administration to remember that when it comes to Iran, Bennett is not that different than Netanyahu.
In March 2015, when Netanyahu spoke before Congress, Bennett was also in Washington, racing between TV studios and congressional offices to advocate against the deal. Both were running against one another in an election that would be held two weeks later, but when it came to Iran, they saw eye-to-eye.
And this is where it will become extremely complicated. Biden will want to get Bennett on board as much as possible to prevent him from coming out too aggressively against a return to the 2015 framework. In their talks, Bennett will have an opportunity to persuade the president to keep the sanctions in place, and maybe even get a few more safeguards into the deal that will ensure a longer break-out time and less of a chance that Iran ever gets a bomb.
It will be a tough situation to manage. On the one hand, Bennett and Lapid both have declared that they want to get along with the Biden administration. Bennett, for example, gave IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kohavi permission to discuss Israel’s position on the deal with National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and other political officials he met with this past week on his visit to Washington.
This was a sharp break from the Netanyahu government, under which elected and appointed officials were banned from discussing Iran with their American counterparts. Everything was controlled through “the Aquarium”, the nickname for the suite of offices where the prime minister’s office is located.
What the Americans need to keep in mind – and so far it seems that they are – is that completely ignoring Israeli concerns will not only weaken the deal and give the Republicans even more of a reason to oppose it (which they will anyhow), but also give Netanyahu ammunition with which to attack Bennett and Lapid and weaken their already fragile government.
Which is why Bennett will have to decide – in that first Oval Office meeting – what exactly he wants to ask of Biden. Is it an agreement on red lines in the deal that if crossed will prompt the US to restore sanctions or even take action? Or is it a boost to Israel’s military capabilities, in the form of additional aid now or the expedited release of new platforms? Or both?
The US could potentially add money to the existing annual aid package that Israel receives, and it could also announce that under a new 10-year MOU that the Defense Ministry has already begun talking about with the Pentagon, it would significantly boost the aid when it comes into effect in about five years.
In other words, there would be an immediate demonstration of support for Israeli security as well as a long-term strategic act of support.
US and Israeli defense industries are quietly preparing lists of what they could offer the IDF if there is going to be some sort of new package deal to offset the fallout from a return to the JCPOA. The work is being done quietly, and for now is being spoken about only at the top levels, mostly in the Air Force.
Would this be enough to stave off Netanyahu? Probably not, but Bennett and Lapid will anyhow need to learn to manage his criticism and attacks and get done what they need to do at the same time.
The critical question no one yet has an answer to is how long the Biden administration will be willing to take all of this into consideration in their desire to advance a new vision for the Middle East. In other words, at what point will their desire to keep Bibi in the opposition give way to other regional aspirations?