He wisely avoided saying that the goal was to defeat Hamas. Hamas is a brutal terrorist organization that has shown it cares nothing about the citizens under its dominion. It will never wave a white flag and surrender. There will always be one terrorist there left to fire one last missile and thereby claim “victory.”
But Hamas can be deterred, just as Hezbollah has been deterred for the last 15 years in Lebanon.
Operation Guardian of the Walls is an attempt to deter Hamas, to disabuse it of the notion that it can call the shots, that it can set itself up as the “Protector of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa,” and send a few rockets toward Israel’s capital whenever there is trouble there.
The past 11 days have witnessed a determined effort to pound into Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad the realization that this just isn’t worth it, that the price is just too high.
Time will tell whether they have been sufficiently deterred, and for how long. Yet Israel has significantly damaged Hamas’s capabilities by smashing the underground tunnel complex known as the “Metro,” by knocking out much of its weapons-producing capabilities, by killing several top officials, and by knocking out rocket launching sites.
The question now is how much longer the campaign should continue and whether it has reached a point of diminishing returns.
We think it is close to that point, and that Israel needs to make sure that it does not forget to find a way to end the fighting. This does not mean agreeing to a ceasefire on any terms, but only one with a clear understanding that any infraction whatsoever will be met with overwhelming force, and only with Jerusalem working hard to ensure the return of the bodies of the two IDF soldiers and two Israeli civilians held by Hamas.
Why agree to a ceasefire? Because if the goal, as Gantz indicated, was to create deterrence, it is not clear how bombing another kilometer of the “Metro,” or killing another Hamas military operative – short of Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar or Mohammed Deif – will create more deterrence.
On the other hand, if the fighting continues, there are a number of risks. The first is that Hamas will chalk up an operational success. So far, it has failed. It may have upended life in Israel, but it failed to bring the kind of death and destruction it dreamed of by sending more than 3,000 rockets onto a civilian population.
Hamas’s attack tunnels into Israel have been neutralized, and it has failed to penetrate the country; its efforts to send suicide drones failed, as did an attempt at a suicide submarine attack. Operationally, Hamas and PIJ have nothing to show for their efforts, and – despite what is sure to be their postwar bravado – they know it.
Another risk is that as the fighting drags on, it may spread to Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, and also lead to more riots in mixed Jewish-Arab cities inside Israel – all scenarios that have already played out and could escalate.
Furthermore, the longer the fighting continues, the more likely it will cause damage to Israel’s ties with its new Abraham Accords partners – the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan.
Hamas took Israel by surprise when it fired rockets at Jerusalem on May 10. Israel didn’t expect that. Nor, however, did Hamas expect the fury and force of Israel’s response.
Short of a ground operation, which Israel is unlikely to undertake, there are questions what more can be gained by continuing the current operation.
Israel’s fight against Hamas is the most legitimate that exists. The IDF is fighting a genocidal terrorist group bent on Israel’s destruction that needs to be stopped.
But the state cannot ignore the need for a realistic exit strategy. It needs to work now to find one.