Turkey’s relation with Syrian proxies tainted by broken promises

Some observers were so impressed with Turkey’s intervention in Libya that they deemed it possible to use it to justify controversial outcome of Turkish involvement in the Syrian conflict.

By AHMAD AL KHALED
A MEMBER of Libyan National Army (LNA) commanded by Khalifa Haftar, points his gun at an image of Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan on a Turkish military armored vehicle, which the LNA said they confiscated during Tripoli clashes. (photo credit: REUTERS)
A MEMBER of Libyan National Army (LNA) commanded by Khalifa Haftar, points his gun at an image of Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan on a Turkish military armored vehicle, which the LNA said they confiscated during Tripoli clashes.
(photo credit: REUTERS)
Although Turkey parades its incursion in Libya as a successful military operation and a demonstration of Turkish military might, sources reveal the ugly underside of this bright picture: Turkey fails to keep promises given to its Syrian proxies, leading to mass defections in their ranks.
Success story?
Last April, forces of Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Hafter launched an assault on Tripoli, the capital of the Government of National Accord, the Libyan National Army’s rival in the struggle for power over the country. Faced with the looming threat of defeat, Government of National Accord Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj pleaded for military help with Turkey, one of his few allies in the region. Ankara was quick to respond: Turkish intelligence agents were sent into the country, military advisers were attached to Government of National Accord units and Turkey-made drones provided air cover.
These measures, most importantly air support, allowed the Government of National Accord to reverse the tide avoid a military defeat. The Libyan National Army offensive stalled and the conflict turned into a prolonged stand-off. The Turkish authorities regard these developments as confirmation of Turkey’s foreign policy moving into the right direction, if not total victory.
Some observers were so impressed with Turkey’s intervention in Libya that they deemed it possible to use it to justify controversial outcome of Turkish involvement in the Syrian conflict.
“What’s happening in Libya today is proof that a direct Turkish military support for the Syrian opposition early in the Syrian war could have defeated Assad and his allies years ago,” claimed Turkish analyst Ragip Soylu.
Yet the “success story” of the Turkish operation in Libya would not be complete without an important detail: besides military advisers and drones, Government of National Accord units are supported by at least 9,000 fighters of Turkey-affiliated armed opposition groups sent in from Syria. Turkey had no difficulty recruiting those willing to go to Libya among the members of the so-called Syrian National Army. Promises of a hefty $2,000 a month on average in addition to Turkish citizenship and compensation for families of deceased fighters proved to be perfect bait for the militants, who are paid just $100 a month in Syria.
Soon it turned out that not all of these promises were made to be kept. Stories told by disillusioned Syrian mercenaries who were tricked by their employer paint a picture that is starkly different from the rhetoric presented by Turkish officials.
Promises broken
“Turkey lied to us,” openly claim Syrian fighters interviewed by “The Investigative Journal” reporter Lindsey Snell, who researched the role played by the Syrian armed factions in the Turkish operation in Libya. The investigation, based on interviews with multiple witnesses produced by Snell, established that none of the promises were kept by Turkey in full.

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The militants were indeed given the promised $2,000 or even more but only for the first month they spent in Libya. The second month some received a considerably smaller reward while others got nothing. Many regarded this as permission to start looting the areas held by the Government of National Accord, said Zein Ahmad, a fighter of Ahrar Al-Sharqiya group.
The promises of granting Turkish citizenship were a lie as well.
“Now that so many Syrians have died in Libya, we know this is also a lie,” says Ahmad, who was able to return to Syria only due to a bribe to his commander. He now plans to leave Ahrar Al-Sharqiya.
Loyalty lost
Zein is not alone in his decision. Sources in Sultan Murad Brigade, another Turkey-affiliated faction that sent fighters to Libya, disclosed that around 2,000 members of the group defected over the past few weeks.
Late in April, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on mass defections in Sultan Murad, estimating the total number of defectors at 700 fighters. Sources among the militants later indicated that the real number was much higher.
Early in May, opposition media outlets revealed that a total of seven units left Sultan Murad. The units’ commanders were named as Adnan Khuwaylid, Arraba Idris, Abu Bilal Hanish, Abu Khaled Al-Saqa, Abu Muhannad Al-Hur, Muhammad Barakat and Fadi Al-Deiri. These units comprise over 2,000 men – almost half of what Sultan Murad has. The reason for the defections was a conflict between the commanders and the leader of Sultan Murad Fahem Issa, who demanded that they dispatch men to Libya – or quit. They chose the latter and took their men and weaponry from the positions in Aleppo and Hasaka provinces.
Like Ahrar Al Sharqiya, Sultan Murad Brigade is considered to be one of the most loyal Turkish proxies. Made up of Syrian Turkmen, the group was in the vanguard of forces that participated in Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring Turkish military operations in Northern Syria. However, they earned their reputation not in battle but rather during the looting that followed.
Sultan Murad was among the first groups to send fighters to Libya as well. The first Syrian fighter killed on Libyan soil came from Sultan Murad: a native of Eastern Ghouta Ahmad Mullah died in clashes with the Libyan National Army south of Tripoli in the beginning of January.
Sources say that despite its close ties with the Turkish intelligence and the “special” status of the group, Sultan Murad fighters are increasingly frustrated with what they perceive as inadequate support coming from Turkey. Members of the group share the same concerns as Zein Ahmad: they also did not receive the compensation promised by the Turkish authorities that served as the key incentive to fight in Libya. “Fight” is more of a general term here, as many fighters were promised that they would be tasked with maintaining security at oil facilities far from the front line. These expectations went down the drain the moment the fighters lured by lucrative pay landed in Libya: they had their first fights and first casualties.
Casualties covered up
Both Sultan Murad Brigade and Ahrar Al-Sharqiya, as well as other units of the Syrian National Army, made no secret of the losses sustained in Syria. Social media accounts of the Syrian National Army factions regularly post messages offering condolences to relatives and friends of the fighters declared martyrs for dying in battle in Syria. In Libya, this modus operandi was subjected to drastic changes.
Members of the Turkey-backed factions witness that they lost hundreds of fighters in Libya. The militants bewail the lack of weapons and training blaming their key backer for the dismal situation.
Although the first Syrian fighters arrived in Libya as early as last December and have been sustaining heavy casualties ever since, not a single mention of it can be found on social media accounts of the factions fighting in Libya. It’s difficult to find an adequate explanation for such sudden secrecy of the militants and their backers aside from the intent to cover up the true scale of casualties.
Dim perspectives
Under these strained circumstances, many fighters are willing to follow the example of Zein Ahmad and bribe their commanders to return to Syria, but the Turkish authorities make no haste. Some of the mercenaries have been fighting in Libya for more than six months without any clear perspective of return date: another sign that it has become increasingly difficult for Turkey to find those willing to travel to Libya, even among its most loyal proxies.
Furthermore, mass defections from the ranks of Sultan Murad show that the Turkish leadership not only faces serious challenges in executing its ambitious plans of entrenching in Libya but also loses its grip on the Syrian opposition. The more Turkey gets involved in Libya, the less likely that it will be able to write a story of success.
The writer is a freelance journalist with primary focus on the involvement of foreign actors in the Syrian conflict and its consequences on both regional and global levels.


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