What the new style of normalization looks like

The first Emirati ambassador to Israel, Muhammad Mahmoud Al Khaja, inaugurated the first embassy of his country in downtown Tel Aviv a month ago, alongside Israeli President Isacc Herzog. Unlike his Tel Aviv-based Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts, Al Khaja was not shy about appearing in a conference, where he spoke in Arabic about peaceful relations between the two sides.

He then began posting on Twitter in Arabic, English, and Hebrew about his public meetings with various Israeli officials and religious leaders, thereby cementing relations on the bureaucratic level and in the public mind.

In parallel, local Emirati TV stations and newspapers covered the historical opening in a similar tone of collaboration and excitement, hosting Emirati commentators alongside Israeli counterparts.

Unlike Egypt and Jordan, whose relations with Israel are still defined by past wars and the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, the UAE is not subject to the same historical or political baggage – sharing no borders with the Jewish state and never having fought a war against it, there are no remnants of battle or human losses in the Emirati collective memory.

While Egypt and Jordan make no attempts to acknowledge at home their diplomatic ties with Israel, the Emirati government is actively branding the normalization deal, particularly pointing to Israeli technological advances and futurist initiatives that could hold future vast payoffs for its citizens.

Emirati closeness to Israel 

Emirati attraction to Israel stems from its wariness of other regional power players, namely Iran and Turkey, whom the UAE views as posing an existential threat.

With a population of both Sunnis and Shiites, Emirati leadership is cautious of any potential sectarian strife that might be spilled from outside powers, which could hurt their brand as an inclusive Muslim country, tolerant toward other denominations and religions. Diplomatic relations with a Jewish state pose no prospect of igniting sectarianism, while conducting business with a regional and global minority further emphasizes the Emirati’s brand of inclusivity.

Moreover, when Emiratis compared Israel’s track record of meddling in Egypt and Jordan’s internal affairs by funding NGOs and political parties, they realized that not only had the Israeli government never intervened in such a way, but in Washington policy circles had stood by them, such as the case of Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi after ousting the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013.

Hence, when growing calls from some Washington policy circles to withdraw from the Middle East and shift focus to the Pacific, Abu Dhabi saw an alliance with Jerusalem as a solution to fill this gap and counter Iran and Turkey.

Additionally, since Israel has long enjoyed bipartisan support from American politicians and presidential administrations, the Emiratis understood that lobbying with the Jewish state against the Iran deal was likely to yield greater success than lobbying on their own.

Finally, Emiratis understood that warm relations with Jerusalem means friendly relations with American-Jewish groups that wield influence with American politicians on both sides of the political divide. Indeed, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) announced last September that it will open an office in the UAE, the first in the Arab world.

Mutual economic interest 

While impoverished Egypt and Jordan have been consistently hesitant to partner with Israel on transformative economic projects for fear of engendering Israeli hegemony (QIZ has been a prime example), the UAE sees Israel as an attractive and equal partner with a strong economy, with whom they can cooperate on issues related to outer space, artificial intelligence, agriculture, health, start-ups, and technology. Indeed, the two countries currently pride themselves in being the fastest in the world to vaccinate large portions of their population.

Immediately after the signing of the Abraham Accords, the prestigious Abu Dhabi Investment Office announced its decision to establish an office in Tel Aviv, and ever since it has been advertising and holding seminars in Hebrew on different ways for Israeli companies to relocate and establish business offices in the small Gulf emirate. Indeed, Emiratis’ seriousness in accommodating Israelis is reflected even in their tourism, with their hotels launching package deals including kosher menus.

Interest in dealing with Israelis economically has become a hot topic among prominent Emirati voices on social media and newspapers. 

On social media platforms, there is an admiration for the Israeli economic success story, despite being boycotted by its Arab neighbors since its establishment. For instance, the deputy chief of police and General Security in Dubai, Dhai Khalfan, tweeted about Jewish financial competence throughout the years, despite their being persecuted in the countries they lived in; and he even called on Emirati merchants to cut ties with Turkish counterparts and deal with the Israelis.

Additionally, Emiratis understand the importance of Israel to world Jewry, and would like to market their country as a tourist destination where Diaspora Jews are welcome.

Last November, Hend Al Otaiba, then director of strategic communications at the Emirati Foreign Ministry, wrote an article in Tablet about UAE-Israel relations, which concluded by extending a “warm welcome” from her government to the American Jewish community, and inviting them to come and visit the Emirate’s “growing” Jewish community.

Anti-normalization still exists

Despite these many advances in diplomacy and cooperation, there is still internal opposition to the normalization deal, which is likely to grow in the event of armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

One criticism of the normalization deal from within the royal household made headlines last January when the wife of Al-Sharaja Governor Jawaher Alqasimi expressed in a tweet her opposition to a virtual meeting between the Emirati and Israeli ministers of education.

However, the UAE’s most prominent anti-normalization voice is political scientist Abdulkaleq Abdulla, who does not acknowledge the existence of Israel publicly, but still appreciates its military advantages over Iran and its proxies. Although Abdulla’s anti-Israel rhetoric is not broadly embraced within the UAE, it is drawing praise from voices in other Gulf states.

Another criticism of peaceful relations with the Jewish state comes from the Emirati Association to Combat Normalization, whose members are mainly Muslim Brotherhood personnel living in exile. It also has a Twitter page with 33.9K followers.

Conclusion

Without US leadership, these historic advances in regional cooperation would not have transpired. Indeed, the manifestation of the Abraham Accords marks a significant milestone in America’s long-standing objectives of transforming Israel’s position in the Arab world and ensuring its integration.

With equal enthusiasm from the UAE and Israel in nurturing their newfound friendship, the current administration can continue to play a key role in ensuring that this relationship will flourish. First, the Biden administration should take a note from the Emiratis and Israelis and leave the Palestinian issue out of economic and political matters.

Second, the administration should encourage Israelis and its wealthy new Gulf partners to take steps toward improving the lives of Palestinians through initiatives like those that have been discussed bilaterally.

Seizing such opportunities will solidify America’s legacy in enabling greater regional stability, security, and trade through the Abraham Accords that it helped bring to light.

Haisam Hassanein is a policy analyst focusing his research writings on Israel relations with the Arab world. He is a former Glazer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.