The current negotiations with Iran and the expected accommodation reflect a dangerous misconception: that the Strait of Hormuz is an unavoidable chokepoint whose disruption would paralyze the global economy. This perception is overstated and enables Iranian leverage—legitimizing an equation built on coercion and terror.
Meanwhile, today it was announced that after a week of blackmail and using the threat as an excuse, Iran was forced to back down and allow the passage of all ships through Hormuz except for ships from the US and Israel. It is clear, then, that the threat in advance was exaggerated, and those calling for surrender were wrong. Under these circumstances, there is no longer an excuse for defeatism.
Saudi Arabia’s position, led by it’s dominant leader MBS—calling to sustain pressure rather than concede—reflects this clearer assessment: the war against Iran should end in defeat to the biggest terror-state-sponsor in the world.
This is not only a Western concern. The primary victims of this dynamic are Arab and Muslim populations across the region, alongside persistent antisemitic violence against Jews worldwide. Allowing energy blackmail to dictate policy rewards the world’s leading state sponsor of terror and perpetuates cycles of escalation.
The reason is structural. The world is no longer dependent on Hormuz in the way it once was. Land-based alternatives already exist and are being used: Saudi pipelines to Yanbu, alongside southern routes via Oman to Gwadar and Asian markets. What was once a single point of failure is increasingly a network of options—undermining the very foundation of this blackmail.
Saudi Arabia’s Petroline to Yanbu already moves 5–7 million barrels per day and is actively used to bypass the strait, while a southern corridor via Oman’s Salalah to Gwadar connects Gulf supply to India, China and broader Asian markets. Together with westward routes to the Mediterranean, these form a three-directional system that materially reduces dependence on Hormuz.
(Not so) new pipelines
In a comprehensive policy framework published in 2025, the Institute outlined a scalable land-based energy corridor linking the Persian Gulf to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Gaza.
The system is anchored by two nodes: an Aqaba Oil & Gas Hub and a Mediterranean export terminal off Gaza. Oil and gas from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar would flow by pipeline to Aqaba and then westward to Europe.
The scale is decisive. The system would carry 7–8 million barrels per day into Aqaba, with total westbound capacity reaching 15–16 million barrels per day—enough to cover Europe’s roughly 10 million barrels per day of imports. Instead of relying on tankers through Hormuz and Suez, Europe could be supplied directly by land.
But this is only one axis. The same system enables eastward flows. From the Gulf and Red Sea, oil can move toward Oman and through Salalah to Gwadar, integrating with China’s existing infrastructure investments and supplying India, Pakistan, China and Japan without reliance on Hormuz. What emerges is not a single bypass, but a network.
Feasibiilty
The building blocks already exist. Saudi Arabia’s Petroline to Yanbu, the UAE’s Fujairah bypass, and longstanding plans for an Iraq–Aqaba pipeline demonstrate both capability and intent.
Critically, these routes are already being used. Saudi Arabia has shifted exports westward through Yanbu during the current escalation, maintaining flows despite maritime risk. This is proof of concept: bypassing Hormuz is not theoretical—it is operational.
China’s investment in Gwadar and Pakistan’s efforts to reroute imports through Red Sea alternatives signal a broader transition. Energy flows are already diversifying away from chokepoints.
The Institute’s proposal connects these fragments into a continuous system: west to Europe via Gaza, east to Asia via Oman and Pakistan, and internally across the Gulf. It aligns with emerging frameworks such as IMEC, turning infrastructure into strategy.
Implications
The key impact is regional: Jordan becomes a hub, with Aqaba scaling into a Yanbu-like petro-industrial center, while Gaza becomes a Mediterranean export gateway combining port infrastructure with its offshore gas reserves—creating transit and production income.
In parallel, the Oman–Gwadar corridor positions Oman and Pakistan as major beneficiaries—an alignment both have already publicly supported.
Conclusion
Iran’s leverage is structural, not absolute—it depends on Hormuz being indispensable. That assumption no longer holds. Pipelines to Yanbu, Red Sea routes, and eastern corridors via Oman to Gwadar already provide real alternatives and reduce dependence on the strait.
The claim that disruption would cripple the global economy is therefore overstated. The risk remains, but it is no longer systemic. Conceding to this pressure would reward a model of coercion built on terror.
Saudi Arabia—most exposed and the world’s largest exporter—has taken the opposite stance, sustaining pressure because it is already operating around Hormuz. The question is no longer whether alternatives exist, but whether they will be scaled to remove this leverage entirely.
Shraga Biran, President of the Institute for Structural Reforms, has spent more than six decades shaping economic, legal and urban policy, focusing on large-scale structural solutions. Through the Institute, he has published extensively on the political economy of the Middle East, including Liberating Gaza (2024) and When Eagle and Dragon Unite (2025). For years, the Institute has warned that Iran’s leverage over global energy would become a defining issue of the world order. In November 2025, well before the current escalation, it published a detailed plan to neutralize that leverage.