Forty days of war in Gaza has been a major game-changer in the region. The war, which began with Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, has led to unprecedented levels of violence, and major potential strategic changes.
Hamas rose to power in the late 1980s and 1990s, offering to the Palestinian public a more extreme position, with its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. It rode a wave of extremism in the ’90s in which regional groups preyed on young people and sought to topple secular regimes.
In the Palestinian context, Hamas was successful in garnering support in Gaza and the West Bank, particularly among students. It used bus bombings and terror attacks to try to derail the Oslo peace process, which proved successful because its radicalization program helped underpin the Second Intifada.
But it wasn’t the only group to do this. Hezbollah also claimed victory after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Other groups linked to the Palestinian Authority-ruling part of Fatah believed they could benefit from what appeared to be an Israeli withdrawal. Not land for peace, they thought – they would give Israel war and get land.
Islamists took advantage of a leadership vacuum
This didn’t work. The Second Intifada was a defeat for the Palestinians. It also led Israelis to believe peace would not come in the future. The Disengagement from Gaza, though, was one result. Hamas benefited from this and won the Palestinian elections, which were part of the US-backed democratization plans for the region in the wake of toppling Saddam. This came in the context of the Global War on Terror.
Hamas’s rise in the 1990s then, and its success in the Palestinian elections in January 2006, were part of the same process. Islamic groups, such as those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, wanted to use elections and violence to achieve results. They jumped into the vacuum left by decaying and aging regimes, and they exploited the US involvement in the region. As such, they were also at the forefront of the insurgency in Iraq.
Iran also benefited. It fueled Hezbollah in Lebanon and moved militias into Iraq. Hamas was able to commit a coup against Fatah in Gaza in 2007. Soon Hamas had full control and was able to turn Gaza into a kind of terror experiment playground. It built rockets and extended their range, targeting Israel increasingly in 2008.
It also kidnapped Gilad Schalit in 2006, which encouraged Hezbollah to try a similar attack, resulting in the Second Lebanon War. Meanwhile, in Gaza in 2009, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead, a bloody conflict that convinced Benjamin Netanyahu, when he came to power soon after, not to try a similar operation.
This is how we got to 2023. Israel settled into a series of short border wars with Hamas. The 2014 war to dismantle tunnels in Gaza was an exception. However, even that 50-day conflict played out along the lines that were expected. Hamas waited in Gaza. The Israelis left. Most Hamas commanders survived. In fact, Hamas leadership grew more powerful.
When Yahya Sinwar was released in the Schalit deal in 2011 he soon climbed the ranks to run Gaza in 2017. Ismael Haniyeh went to Doha to live abroad. Hamas leadership thus grew in power in the region. In Lebanon, Hamas began to stockpile more weapons. Salah Arouri and others fueled Hamas success. It also got more backing from Turkey’s ruling AKP party, which also has roots in the Brotherhood. By 2018-2019, it was getting red carpet receptions in Turkey.
Hamas decided at this time to launch the Great Return March on the Gaza border. This coincided with other changes in the region. The Syrian civil war was winding down. Iran and Russia were winning. Turkey also invaded Syria and together, Turkey, Iran, and Russia met at Astana and other forums and began to coordinate against the US in the region.
Trump's role in the chaos
The chaos of the Trump administration years enabled them to work more closely, even if there were setbacks for them, such as the US killing Qasem Soleimani. Hamas learned a lot from this. It saw the Syrian regime winning and returning to areas on the Syrian side of the Golan, and also to Albukamal on the border with Iraq. Soon Iranian weapons were flowing to Hezbollah via Syria, despite Israel’s campaign between the wars to reduce this entrenchment.
Hamas saw the rise of Iran’s militias in Iraq, after they helped defeat the Kurds in Kirkuk in 2017. It saw how Iran was able to increase militias in Syria and increase attacks on the US. Hamas also saw the Houthis in Yemen achieve results. China brokered a Saudi-Iran deal. Syria rejoined the Arab League. Israel slipped into domestic chaos with endless elections that began in 2018 when Avigdor Liberman resigned as defense minister over Gaza policy. Hamas now knew that Israel wouldn’t threaten it in Gaza.
As such, Hamas believed its October 7 attack could help push the region into a new era. The Abraham Accords were one trend of regional integration. But the Iran trend was another side of the coin. Iran was able to keep Lebanon in chaos and increase backing for Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, essentially moving the chaos of the region closer to Israel. To challenge regional integration and the Abraham Accords and new economic initiatives, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and militias in Iraq and Syria were ready to coordinate a multi-front conflict in the region.
In the wake of the Hamas attack they have illustrated that they can coordinate, to a point. The Houthis have targeted Israel. Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria have carried out 50 attacks on US forces. Hezbollah has carried out daily attacks on Israel. This is all unprecedented. In addition, Turkey, Russia, China, and Qatar have refused to condemn Hamas terrorism. This shows they are using October 7 to create a new world order.
Massive anti-Israel protests in the West are also unprecedented. We saw a hint of this in the May 2021 conflict. Now it is on steroids. In addition, Saudi Arabia hosted the Iranian president and Syrian president as part of a large gathering of Arab and Muslim countries, aimed at discussing Gaza. Not all these countries agree. However, Israel faces a strategic hurdle now in the region and in the global south. Israel is being targeted by countries that want to use this war to erode US standing in the region. Iran wants to fuel this war to make it a larger war against the US and Israel. This is a major challenge for trends such as peace and stability.
Forty days into the war it remains to be seen if Hamas can be decisively beaten. And it remains to be seen how Hamas will try to benefit in the region. Hamas leaders in Doha and elsewhere continue to try to keep the initiative in their hands. Israel is winning on the ground. But the regional and strategic issues remain up in the air and contested.