The United States employs a strategy of exaggerating its adversaries’ strength and inflating their capabilities to satisfy their ego. This approach is part of the tactics used for subsequent engagement, whether in direct or indirect negotiations or to catch them off guard in military or economic confrontations.
In this context, we can understand White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby’s statements. The White House national security adviser said the US believes the Iranians when they say they will respond to Israel. He added that he would not discuss their intelligence assessments, but certainly could not read Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s mind or know what he was thinking.
Kirby does not speak idly when referring to the inability to predict Khamenei’s decisions or access his directives on responding to Ismail Haniyeh’s killing. It is as if US intelligence agencies do not understand the thought pattern of Iran’s leader, or as if Israeli intelligence, which infiltrated a terrorist proxy’s bedroom in Tehran, cannot penetrate the Supreme Leader’s inner circle.
However, Kirby knows the Iranian mullahs want to feel they are sowing fear in their American enemies. This might satisfy the egos of Khamenei and his companions, prompting them to deflate after each targeting of their leaders, officials, terrorist arms, and regional proxies.
This psychological method is well-practiced by the American side to deal with the Iranian mindset, nested with the arrogance of power and pride. The US understands this mentality and knows how to influence its decisions and behaviors. The mullahs want fuel for their propaganda to attract supporters. This mentality differs from the practical Western approach that focuses on achieving goals and strategic gains without concern for the propaganda of failed regimes.
If we assume Kirby is serious and Western intelligence cannot realistically assess Iran’s next move, we imagine the Iranian response scenarios relate not only to Khamenei’s mind but also to Iran’s actual capabilities to implement threats, which often exceed ground capabilities. This populist regime relies heavily on propaganda and slogans. We should not dwell on every phrase from its leaders, as they are mostly fiery speeches and ambiguous statements in the service of mass mobilization and psychological warfare, rather than real positions.
Some regime supporters, including Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, justify the delayed response by saying the waiting itself is part of the response, considering it psychological and military attrition for the other side. They argue that keeping Israeli leaders in shelters or unable to move freely is a disaster for Israel.
Iranian strategy
Exporting fear of the Iranian response is a strategy that satisfies the mullahs’ self-importance.
Their psyche has calmed after media reports of Israeli shelters lacking air conditioning – and of a doomsday bunker for Netanyahu’s government. These reports feed Iranian leaders’ euphoria, pushing them to repeat threats that exacerbate Israeli fear as part of the response and punishment.
IRAN LIKELY does not want to start a full war, but bets that escalating Israeli fear will push Netanyahu to accept a preemptive strike he previously rejected. Iran seeks to avoid attacking Israel, relying on a second-strike strategy. This would allow maximum military capability use without considering international reactions. Their calculations may relate to Russia and China’s positions, as any Israeli preemptive strike would put Iran in a clearer state of legitimate self-defense than the targeting of Hamas’s political bureau head on its territory.
The Iranian decision-makers’ patience in this crisis is not new. The “carpet weaver” strategy implemented since the 1979 revolution explains their slow reactions to actions. Khameini’s calculations differ from those of traditional politicians. He is primarily a cleric focused on revolutionary goals and extended ideology rather than short-term political objectives.
This sometimes leads to speculation about fabricated joint Iranian-American-Israeli conspiracies against the Arab world – although interests do sometimes intersect, as in targeting Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 and the Taliban in 2001. This pragmatic policy allows the Iranian regime to avoid strikes and coexist with severe crises.
In conclusion, Khameini’s mind prioritizes the regime’s interests over the Iranian state or proxy movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah, which can be sacrificed for the regime’s survival. The decision to respond depends on its impact on the mullahs’ and their regime’s fate, and nothing else.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.