Jordan went to the polls on September 10. This parliamentary election marked two significant milestones for the nation. It resulted in a strengthening of Islamist – and therefore anti-Israel – power within Jordan’s political arena. And it saw the Hashemite Kingdom take its first, hesitant step toward its declared intention of converting itself into a constitutional monarchy within the next decade.
When he took over the throne in February 1999, King Abdullah II inherited a royal autocracy. In line with Arab rulers for centuries past, the monarch had, and still possesses absolute powers. He appoints and can dismiss the government, appoints the members of the upper house of the legislature, and he initiates legislation – the lower chamber is limited to approving, rejecting, or amending it.
The Arab Spring, starting in 2011, witnessed popular insurrections across the Arab world and the fall of a succession of Arab leaders. Abdullah’s reaction was to promise his people slow but steady movement toward a more democratic constitution for Jordan. Ten years later there was little evidence of any change, and, in April 2021, a shocking conspiracy to replace Abdullah with his half-brother, the former crown prince Hamzah, was revealed.
A relative of Abdullah together with the king’s former top confidant were charged with devising a “criminal project” involving Hamzah, once heir to the throne. Found guilty of sedition and incitement against the crown, the men each received a jail sentence of 15 years with hard labor. Hamzah was not arrested, and Abdullah announced that the dispute with him would be resolved within the royal family.
One result was that in June 2021, Abdullah set up a 92-member commission, headed by former prime minister Samir Rifai, charged with creating a plan to modernize Jordan’s elections and the laws governing political parties. The commission decided that within a decade, Jordan’s long-established royal autocracy would be converted into a constitutional monarchy. Governments would no longer be appointed by the king but would be formed from the nationally elected members of parliament.
With that decision as a ground plan, a subcommittee approved an election law that, among other things, provided for gradually increasing political party representation in parliament. This would occur over the following three elections, until finally the sort of democratic arrangement applying in the UK or Sweden would be reached. The leader of the largest political party emerging from the election would become prime minister and form a government.
The recent election marked the first phase in the planned reform. It allocated 30% of the 138 parliamentary seats to political parties. Phase two is scheduled to occur in the 2028 election when they will occupy 50%. The process is planned to culminate in the elections in 2032 when political parties will occupy 65% of the seats.
Will Jordan's parliament fall to the hands of Islamists?
By then, if the current results are any indication, Jordan’s parliament and possibly its government would be in the hands of Islamists. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), a political offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has been at the forefront of growing calls in Jordan to repeal the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Ever since the Hamas pogrom of October 7, demonstrators have been surrounding the Israeli Embassy in Amman, demanding its closure and the repeal of the treaty.
So far, these calls have been strongly resisted by the government, representing Abdullah’s view that the treaty is a bulwark against regional instability. If Abdullah yielded even a fraction of his power to a political leader elected and mandated by popular vote, there would be a real danger of Jordan turning its back on the peace treaty. Abdullah will be aware that copper-bottomed guarantees safeguarding his ultimate authority will have to be built into Jordan’s planned constitutional reform – if, indeed, it proceeds past phase one.
While there is general support for the 10-year reform process, there are opponents who are skeptical of the strength of the will for political reform.
Nedal Mansour, a human rights activist and leader in the country’s civil society movement, is reported as saying there is little reason for Jordanians to believe that change will happen.
“People are not convinced that there is a serious will for reform. They feel that they are buying time by talking about gradual reform…Why should we wait another 10 years? The fact is that nothing has happened in terms of reform in the past 20 years; why will the system be any different in the coming years?”
The September 10 election resulted in Jordan’s leading Islamist opposition party, the IAF, winning 31 out of the 138 parliamentary seats. The party had 10 seats in the previous parliament. The turnout was only some 32% of the 5 million-plus eligible voters.
Half of the 11-million strong Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin, and during the election campaign, the Islamists had capitalized on people’s growing anger over the continuing war in Gaza. The IAF’s strategy may have fostered unfortunate results.
On the Sunday before the election, September 8, a truck approached the Allenby Bridge from the Jordanian side. It stopped not far from the crossing into Israel, and video footage shows the driver walking toward the terminal, raising a weapon and firing three times. Each shot was fatal, and he killed three Israeli civilian guards: Yohanan Shchori, Yuri Birnbaum, and Adrian Marcelo Podzamczer.
Security personnel returned fire, and the gunman – later identified as Maher Jazi, a Jordanian – was killed.
Hamas officials did not claim responsibility for the attack but described it as a “natural response” to the war in Gaza. A recent news report indicates that the joint Jordanian-Israeli investigation into the shooting is currently focused on whether the perpetrator acted alone or whether some extremist group, operating from within Jordan, has embarked on a series of terrorist attacks against Israel.
Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear that Jordan is currently in a febrile state, with the king and the government attempting to prevent widespread pro-Hamas sentiment from boiling over into active protests or worse. The IAF’s formal access of increased power and influence, following the parliamentary elections, is not calculated to pour oil on the troubled waters.
Meanwhile, Jordan’s constitutional and political future looks even more uncertain.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.